Introduction
This article posits that two constituent mythologies sustain and drive the European Union (EU) integration process. The first is the tension between the twin narratives of 'perpetual peace' and 'perpetual suffering.' The narrative script of 'perpetual peace' promotes post-Communist Europe as a post-historical paradise. Paradoxically, this narrative can only function in tandem with the inverse narrative of 'perpetual suffering,' a narrative script that argues that Europe is the continent that carries the burden and pain of the twentieth century. The second fundamental mythology of the EU project is the tension between the narratives of Europe as, on the one hand 'authentic' and as 'cosmopolitan' on the other. By authenticity I am referring to the rich and diverse cultural traditions of the European continent. This narrative script argues that the quaint, parochial and national traditions of the past are successfully functioning side by side with a modern cosmopolitan Generation E sensibility (Reid 2005, 3) . Both of these constituent mythologies are essential in forming what is emerging as a pan-European, Europtimist raison d'etre. However, although this article considers these narratives to be powerful, it does not regard them as all-encompassing. In this article I argue that two recent novels, the Australian Christos Tsiolkas's Dead Europe (2005) , and the French Michel Houellebecq's The Possibility of an Island (2006) , subvert these two mythologies, in the process undermining the legitimacy of recent works of Europtomist scholarship.
Whose Europe?
In 2005 Christos Tsiolkas published Dead Europe, a novel that sought to subvert the European imaginary landscape from a Greek-Australian perspective-born in Australia, his parents were Greek immigrants-by issuing a challenge to Europeans from the Antipodes: Europe, you are absent of life. Former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was taken to task for dividing Europe into 'old' and 'new,' but Tsiolkas is after the knock-out punch: Europe, you are not even alive. With what legitimacy can Tsiolkas, an outsider, discuss the big themes of our time-history, migration, blood, belonging, poverty, refuge, anti-Semitism-in such a European and realist fashion (Syson 2005, 4) ? In America Jean Baudrillard wrote, 'Europe can no longer be understood by starting out from Europe itself ' (1988, 98) , and Tsiolkas starts his story on the other side of the world in suburban Melbourne.
Dead Europe tells the story of Isaac, a Greek-Australian photographer invited to Athens to help celebrate the culture of the Greek diaspora. His exhibition makes a dismal understatement and he is overwhelmed by the changes that have taken place in Greece and the rest of Europe. The wave of hope that Isaac experienced when he was last in Death in a photograph is not merely a matter of focus or of composition. It is not only the light. It is not the subject. There are photographs that are blurred or ugly or too dark or over-exposed, they can be banal or boring or incompetent. But that does not necessarily make them dead. Death is, of course, simply the absence of life, of the heart and the blood and the soul. The absence of fluid and flesh. The eyes that stared back at me from my photos were dead. The trees, and asphalt streets, dead. All my subjects were muted and still. Not calm, but inert. The absence of motion. I would emerge from the darkroom every time, and the smell of chemicals was death on my skin, on my hands. (46) The sustained metaphor of Europe as 'lifeless' in Tsiolkas's I can only respond with the following: every narrative in the end is a form of explanation (Dray 28, 2003) . When we ask the questions-what is a story?; what does it mean to follow a story?-it is perhaps useful to think of the extent that stories explain ourselves to ourselves. According to Margaret Somers, it matters not whether we are social scientists or subjects of historical research but 'that we come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple and changing) by our location (usually unconsciously) in social narratives and networks of relations that are rarely of our own making ' (2003, 360) . In other words, we are always embedded in social narratives. Whether we recognise it or not, our social identities are constituted through narrativity.
Both Dead Europe and The Possibility of an Island create a textual social reality with Rather than finding the differences between the novels problematic, I posit that these differences can offer a more enriching understanding of the process in which the constituent mythologies of authenticity and cosmopolitanism, peace and suffering, have emerged over the last few decades. and not just one country or city, to be 'home ' (199) . Whether Euro-optimist or Eurosceptic, the argument always fits into the same narrative script: Europe is unique, increasingly diverging from the hegemonic superpower priorities of the USA. The idea of Europe and the USA being worlds apart is now part of accepted media discourse, reaffirmed on an almost daily basis in the mass media around such important issues as the invasion of Iraq and discussion of the business regulations that govern global industry.
Contested Narratives
According to Reid, the growing sense that the USA is no longer the continent's protector, but rather a potential threat-or even, perhaps, the greatest threat-has strengthened the movement toward 'ever closer union' among the members of the EU Yugoslavia' (1). MacDonald methodically deconstructs the idea of the twentieth century as being the most 'atrocious' in history, and mounts a convincing argument against that idea by highlighting the destructive legacy of colonialism in previous centuries, and by citing the genocide of the indigenous populations in the Americas and Australia. But the important point of MacDonald's argument, in my view, is not whether or not the twentieth century was the most destructive in history, but why it is imagined to be so.
As Shelley Wright argues the difference between the pre and post-Holocaust world is not that the world has necessarily become any more violent or evil. Rather, the Holocaust has forced us to 'understand that the violence of ethnic tribalism is not confined to Africa, or Asia, or the Middle East, or the cities of Eastern Europe-it is here, at home-We are the Savage' (Wright 2001, 18-9) . Europe has thus taken on board the 'evil' of the twentieth century and narrativised it through various modes of commemoration and fin de siecle memoirs. Thus evil is somehow intrinsically linked to the European space, since some of the worst excesses of the twentieth century occurred on European soil, the geographic location of the First World War, most of the Second World War, the Holocaust, fascist dictatorial regimes, the oppressive Soviet Union and its satellite states, civil wars, ethnic tensions and economic devastations. When this historical context is taken into account, the EU project is nothing short of remarkable.
The ex-UK Prime Minister Tony Blair acknowledged the historic dimensions of the EU integration process when complaining about the tediousness of EU summits:
They do go on a bit. You know, these summits make sense if you try to have a sense of history. I mean, when the thing is getting tiresome, you have to remember what we are doing here. We are building a new world superpower. The European Union is about the projection of collective power, wealth and influence. That collective strength makes individual nations more powerfuland it will make the EU as a whole a global power. (quoted in Reid 2005, 2) In the narrativisation of the twentieth century as essentially a 'European' century of 'total' war, it is not surprising that the narrative script of post-1989 Europe is that of 'total' or 'perpetual' peace. And this narrative script is sustained by its twin narrative of perpetual suffering: Europe now has peace because it has suffered. This is a logical equation, but also one that may be subverted, as my discussion of the two novels will suggest. The narrative of 'perpetual suffering' might be news to Aboriginal Australians, to the peoples of East Timor, Rwanda, Nicaragua, Burma, and countless other localities of suffering and destruction where havoc has been wreaked on domestic populations.
But according to MacDonald, this underlines the trend, as Chakrabarty has also noted, 'of putting 'Europe first, the rest of the world later ' (2000, 2) . The European Union integration process continues the narratives of the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century, skipping over the trauma of the twentieth century as more or less an historical glitch. The perpetuity of suffering is not erased, nor forgotten; rather it is commemorated, sustaining and validating the narrative of 'perpetual peace.'
A post-historical EUtopia
Il faut être absolument moderne We have to be utterly modern.
Arthur Rimbaud, Une Saison en Enfer Arthur Rimbaud, A Season in Hell
In Europe almost every truism can be challenged and deconstructed: the nation-state, the border, the citizen, the immigrant, the intellectual, the peasant, the terrorist, the nationalist, the war criminal. Everything in Europe can be negated, turned in on itself, self-cannibalised. In the opinion pages of Europe's serious newspapers, intellectuals are given free reign to imagine Europe as a negation. Europe is not … One of the more recent and interesting critical approaches in imagining 'Europe' has been by Nicolaidis and Howse who argue that the EU is a civilian power promoting an 'EUtopia' through narratives of projection (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002) . That is, the EU seeks to 'reproduce' itself 'by encouraging regional integration around the world' Derrida would thus seem to be gesturing toward a Europe with a particular tradition, a particular language-or particular languages, beginning with Greek and Latin-and a particular history, but a Europe that then calls out for or calls us toward a Europe that exceeds any particular European or Eurocentric vision, a Europe that might be rooted in certain European ideals, notably those of the Enlightenment (democracy, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, liberal education and so on), but that would call all those who hear the promise and hope of these values beyond their current understanding and deployment-whether in what is called Europe today or anywhere else in the world. 'A Europe of Hope' would thus refer at once to this historical thing called Europe, this continent identifiable on a map, and to a Europe that remains to come-not only in France or Germany, Italy or Spain, but in the United States or Australia, in Algeria or China. (2005, 6) Thus, Naas argues, the 'only real solution for the future, of actually thinking through and reflecting upon Europe today not in order to say "yes" or "no" to it, but so as to criticise what has to be criticised within it and to realise the best of what it has promised ' (2005, 23) . Both Derrida and Nicolaidis and Howse thus argue that although a European ideal might begin with Europe, it must then seek to engage with ideas outside of Europe, accommodating the best of European thought and tradition with the best that the rest of the world has to offer. A 'Europe of Hope' is, according to Naas, a
Europe of endless, critical reflection, of analysis and discussion (Naas 2005, 22 Possibility of an Island is marked by the absence of these historical burdens.
The Possibility of an Island demonstrates that political ideology has been superseded by the culture of youth and image. Daniel is a victim of the fallout from the 1960s' sexual revolution: alienated by consumerism, incapable of belief, and prisoner to his restless desire (Adams 2005, 15) . The Possibility of an Island whilst evidently a scalding social critique of contemporary European society is, according to Robert Peluso, more than anything an attack on philosophical materialism, with 'its favouring of rationality over sensualism, its glorification of the imperial individual over the collective human being and its predilection for seduction and domination rather than unselfish love and goodwill ' (2006, F-6) . In Dead Europe, the outsiders are the underclass of refugees and migrants from Europe's former colonies. In The Possibility of an Island, however, any
European who does not find glory in the 'imperial individual' is an outsider. In
Houellebecq's narrative, therefore, almost everyone over the age of forty is superfluous.
Although Daniel is disgusted by this 'generational holocaust,' he views such moral abominations as a natural outgrowth-even an evolutionary step-of a modern consumer culture fixated on the young (Schacht 2006 Isaac's (and to a certain extent Daniel's) descent into 'A Season in Hell' is also a threnody for the loss of 'authentic' European culture. The Mediterranean culture that was once concerned with the enjoyment of life and expansive notions of community has been replaced by a 'Western' mass culture obsessed with consumption and excess.
According to Tsiolkas:
As the nation becomes more westernised there are more and more people finding themselves alienated from the new Europe … Travel anywhere in the EU and you are confronted by the mass of refugees and migrants. So at the same time we are supposedly global and connected through the Net and through commerce we are also building detention centres and creating laws that are about sealing ourselves off from those in exile. (2007) As a 'sustained metaphor' this threnody of loss extends to all local cultures of the European Union that are being disseminated in the name of creating a uniform and homogenous supra-state.
Deadly Possibilities
If the overarching theme of both novels is moral decadence, that decadence is pathologised by both Tsiolkas and Houellebecq as a modern syndrome, in that to be modern means 'never being satisfied.' According to Tsiolkas, 'I think Australians and
Europeans and the Americans are now truly decadent cultures. There is a danger in excess and the danger is a spiritual and moral emptiness ' (2007 (Peluso 2006, F-6) .
Conclusion
In Europe today, to be utterly modern is to live in 'perpetual peace,' acknowledge the horrors of the 'European Century,' and enjoy cosmopolitan lifestyles, yet at the same time to celebrate 'national' diversities. These mythologies cannot be objectively demonstrated; nonetheless they function discursively in order to erase the horrors of the twentieth century. It cannot be disputed that the European Union project has been immensely successful in promoting these mythologies. Any serious challenges to these mythologies, such as the recent invasion of Iraq in 2003, lead to a mass mobilisation of European peoples on the streets in protest. The re-emergence of far-right political parties, which also have the potential to undermine these mythologies, has so far been relegated to the margins of European society. Dead Europe and The Possibility of an Island, however, highlight that beneath these mythologies lie two significant tensions.
The first is that underneath Europe's post-historical paradise lurk the national stories and histories of the peoples being forgotten in the EU integration process. These stories must be acknowledged if the European Union is to be true to the ideals of equality and justice. The second fundamental tension is that the EU is successfully accommodating both a cosmopolitan E-generation Europe and the values and traditions of 'authentic'
Europe. Tsiolkas and Houellebecq demonstrate, albeit in different ways, that to be utterly modern means bringing these two different Europes into confrontation. Yet, in the end, although both novels do not offer us a satisfying resolution to the 'big themes,' they do promote a worthwhile discussion. Although Isaac's photographs chronicle authentic Europe's slow death, his cousin Giulia is there once again to remind us that it is impossible to know where modernity will take us: 'this place has been here for thousands of years and it will be here when your euro and your EU and your fucking NATO will be just memories …' (Tsiolkas 2005, 106 ). It's hard to argue against that.
